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An Analysis of the Application of Club Good Models to Determine Carrying 
Capacity of National Parks 
 
 
The National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 requires that park managers develop and 
implement a plan regarding visitor carrying capacity.  In response, econometricians 
have developed models that may be helpful to park management in regards to meeting 
this goal.  The focus of this paper is to highlight some of the earlier work done by 
Buchanan (1965) and Ng (1973) in regards to modeling club goods and then to examine 
more recent attempts by Turner (2000) and Prato (2001) in applying these models to help 
determine carrying capacity of national parks.  Turner (2000) and Prato’s (2001) models 
will then be evaluated in regards to potential implementation proble ms. 
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An Analysis of the Application of Club Good Models to Determine Carrying 
C a p a c i t y  o f  N a t i o n a l  P a r k s 
 
I. Introduction  
 The US National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 required that national parks 
must be managed such that scenery, natural and historic objects, and wildlife are 
conserved.  This act also mandated that the park managers should provide recreational 
opportunity for visitors and non-impairment of resources (Prato, 2001).  These two 
important goals have been difficult to balance as national parks have experienced 
increased visitors and thus higher levels of congestion.  Subsequently, the National 
Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 required that park managers develop a plan to identify 
and implement such a plan to address visitor carrying capacity (Prato, 2001). 
 
II. Public v. Private Goods 
 Economists have struggled to find a satisfactory treatment for those goods which 
do not fall neatly into one of the two categories of public (collective-consumption) and 
private (individual-consumption) goods.  While it may be more satisfying (in terms of 
analysis) to distinguish between these two types of goods, in reality, a number of goods 
fall between these two polar opposites.    
Weisbrod (1964) points out that there is a significant number of private goods that 
have characteristics of public goods.  Because the frequency of purchase of quasi-public 
goods is uncertain and the associated costs of expanding production once services have 
been reduced, Weisbrod (1964) felt that social welfare is benefited by subsidizing the 
production of these goods. 
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Using Sequoia National Park, Weisbrod (1964) first made the assumption that 
even with admission fees it would be impossible to cover total costs.  This is due to the 
lack of traditional external consumption or production factors.  Another hindrance is 
that the commodity is not storable and therefore cannot be purchased and then used at a 
later date.  With total costs being greater than total revenue, Marshallian analysis would 
dictate that the park be closed and that alternative uses for the park’s resources should be 
found.  Of course, this is only considering allocative efficiency and ignores social 
welfare factors.  Ignored in this case are the people who are willing to pay for the option 
to purchase this commodity (visit the park) in the future.  This “option value” will have 
little influence in the private market, however, because there is no practical mechanism 
for calculating user fees.  Furthermore, if revenue is insufficient and the park is closed, 
the option demand for future park usage will not be taken into account (Weisbrod, 1964, 
473). 
Weisbrod (1964) then considers the case where user fees are adequate to cover 
total costs.  This means that “the option demand of persons who [are] not current 
consumers would be satisfied at zero marginal cost (Weisbrod, 1964, 473).”  That is to 
say, so long as the park is in operation, the option exists as a pure public good.  A pure 
public good is defined as a good that can be consumed simultaneously without detracting 
from the consumption opportunities for others.  This means that the park can then be 
viewed as having an external economy with two outputs: service to users and stand-by 
services to non-users. 
The latter statement is difficult to quantify due to the fact that some of the “stand-
by” users will not become actual users.  Aside from considering the frequency of 
Smith 
 
5 
purchase, another consideration is the high costs of expansion or recommencement of 
production in a short time frame.  This, in fact, may be an impossible demand.  
Consider the case where a large section of trees has been cut down.  In Sequoia National 
Forest, it would take centuries for the forest area to be restored.  This means that the 
occasional user would find it difficult, if not impossible, to purchase the good.  In this 
case, the costs associated with recommencement of production are too high (Weisbrod, 
1964). 
In their book The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, Richard 
Cornes and Todd Sanders (1996) outline four distinct characteristics of club goods.  The 
first characteristic is that an increase in membership size, and thus increased congestion, 
will lead to an increase in both costs and benefits.  The additional costs are a result of 
the now increased congestion and the benefits are the result of cost reductions that occur 
due to the sharing of membership expenses.  This is in contrast to public goods, where 
costs associated with increased membership will be zero.  Second, club goods will have 
a finite membership.  Third, for club goods, nonmembers have the choice of joining 
another club that offers the same club good, or they may choose not to join a club.  
Fourth, toll fees require that there exist some exclusion mechanism that prevents 
nonmembers from using the club good.   
 
III. General Theory of Clubs 
Buchanan (1965) developed a general theory of clubs in order to bridge the gap 
between purely public and purely private goods.  In the case of pure private goods, 
consumption by one individual automatically reduces the consumption level of another 
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individual.  For pure public goods, however, there is non-rivalry in consumption of 
goods and so goods may be used simultaneously with no effect on competing consumers.   
While pure public goods can serve an infinite number of consumers and pure private 
goods have only an individual consumer, the typical public good usually falls somewhere 
between pure public and private goods and will have a finite number of consumers 
greater than one.  The central question then becomes, what is the optimal number of 
consumers or the membership margin, otherwise defined as “the size of the most 
desirable cost and consumption sharing arrangement (Buchanan, 1965, 2).”  
Using neo-classical models that consider the case of pure private consumption 
only, the individual utility function is written,  
(1) U=U(X1,X2,…,Xn)   
where each X represents the quantities of pure private goods available to each individual 
during a specified time period.  This is then extended to include both pure public and 
private goods, 
(2) U=U(X1,X2,…,Xn,Xn+1,Xn+2,…,Xn+m)   
with Xn+1,Xn+2,…,Xn+m representing the quantity of pure public goods available to each 
individual during a specified time period (Buchanan 1965). 
With a non-pure good, however, an individual’s utility is a function of “the 
number of other persons with whom he must share its benefits (Buchanan, 1965, 3).”  
Sharing here means that the individual consumes a reduced quantity of the good.  
Consider a group of i people sharing one hair cut per month.  This means that each 
person would receive 1/ith haircut per month.  “Given any quantity of final good, as 
defined in terms of the physical units of some standard quality, the utility that the 
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individual receives from this quantity will be related functionally to the number of others 
with whom he shares (Buchanan, 1965, 3).” 
The number of individuals who share the good, or club size, is disregarded in the 
study of pure private goods because the optimal level is unity.  In the case of club 
goods, however, the club size N will need to be included for each good.  The “club size 
variable, N, therefore measures the number of persons who are to join in the 
consumption-utilization arrangements for good X over the relevant time period 
(Buchanan, 1965, 4).”  This produces the rewritten utility function,  
(3) U=U((X1,N1),(X2,N2),…,(Xn+m,Nn+m))      
From here, it is possible to derive the marginal conditions for Pareto optimality.  First, 
define the production function as, 
(4) F=F’((X1,N1),(X2,N2),…,(Xn+m,Nn+m))   
The club-size is a necessary part of this function because a relationship exists between 
club-size and cost and club-size and quantity purchased.  For example, a larger club-size 
will usually result in lower collected fees.  As a negative externality, however, this may 
result in reduced quantity of service.  A large golf club, for example, may mean it is 
more difficult to schedule a tee time (Buchanan, 1965).  
 The production function makes it possible to derive equations for the necessary 
marginal conditions for Pareto optimality with respect to consumption for two goods Xj 
and Xr.  Because the marginal rate of substitution for consumption is equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution for production, 
(5) uj/ur=fj/fr   
and by incorporating club-size, this can be written as, 
Smith 
 
8 
(6) uNj/ur=fNj/fr   
This relationship says that equilibrium occurs when the marginal benefits of adding a 
new member to the club are equal to the marginal cost of adding a member to the club.  
We can then combine (5) and (6) to show, 
(7) uj/fj=ur/fr=uN/fN   
When (7) is satisfied, the individual will have an optimal quantity of Xj and will be 
“optimally” sharing this good over a finite group of individuals (Buchanan, 1965). 
 
IV. Ng Model 
 Beginning with Buchanan’s equation (6), Ng (1973) believes that the 
“conditions…obtained are the equilibrium conditions for an individual, given his market 
opportunities and assuming he can choose his preferred Nj.  [Therefore], for Pareto 
optimality, we have to maximize the utility of an individual, subject to the constraints that 
the level of utility of each other individual is held constant and that society’s production 
possibilities are given (Ng, 1973, 291).”   
 Let there be s individuals, m collective goods, and (n-m) private goods modeled 
by the following utility function for each ith individual 
(N!) ),...,,,...,,( 1,111
i
n
i
mimmmi
ii XXDNXDNXUU   
where Xj and Nj represent the quantity of and the number of individuals consuming the 
jth collective good, X j
i
 is the amount of the jth private good consumed by the ith 
individual, and Dij=1 if individual i belongs to club j and 0 if not.  Divisibility in the 
quantity of all goods and continuousness of Nj is also assumed (Ng, 1973).   
 The production function can then be written  
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Next, by combining equations N4, N5, and N6 and using Xn as a numeraire, 
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Utilizing the fact that U UXj
i
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i  0  for individuals not consuming Xj, equation N7 can 
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However, due to the fact that Nj is a discrete variable, it is more appropriate to use 
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“This says that, for each collective good, any individual in the club must derive a total 
benefit from the consumption of that good in excess of (or at least equal to) the aggregate 
marginal disutility imposed on all other consumers in the club (Ng, 1973, 293).”  The 
reverse is also true for individuals not in the club.  Equation N9’ says that aggregate 
marginal valuation equals the marginal cost (this is the Samuelson condition with the 
exception that the set of consumers does not need to equal the set of individuals in 
society, or Nj ≠ s.  This differs from Buchanan’s analysis in that Buchanan’s equilibrium 
equation (6) is no longer necessary for Pareto optimality.  This is due to the fact that “Nj 
enters into the utility function of a number of consumers simultaneously, and each 
consumer cannot vary at Nj at will.  Hence the relevant condition for each Nj is the 
aggregate marginal valuation rather than the individual marginal valuation (Ng, 1973, 
293).”  
 
V. Turner Model 
 Visitors making use of national parks enjoy a variety of activities, including:  
hiking, biking, fishing, boating, swimming, cross-country skiing, horseback riding, and in 
some parks snowmobiling.  As the number of people making use of park services has 
risen, park congestion has increased, diminishing user benefits.  This congestion creates 
a situation where national parks are not purely public goods, but rather are club goods.  
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Using Glacier National Park, Turner (2000) developed a hypothetical model for 
managing multiple activities at a national park.  In particular, Turner’s model considers 
entrance fees and other user fees (Turner, 2000). 
 Turner’s analysis employs a variable-utilization mixed-club model.  This method 
was chosen because the club (national parks) consists of a group of members (park 
visitors) who have diverse tastes and therefore will utilize the club differently.  In this 
case, the “club is a single multiproduct club with unrestricted membership; the park is 
unique, it offers more than one activity and admission to the park is open to all (though 
there may be an entrance fee or other toll that some individuals choose not to pay) 
(Turner, 2000, 475).”  In order to simplify the model, visitors are restricted to two 
activities, or two goods (Turner, 2000). 
 Turner defines individual utility as a function of a numeraire good y, recreation V, 
and wilderness W.  Since wilderness is a public good, everyone consumes an equal 
amount.  Therefore, an individual’s utility can be written as U=U(y,V,W).  Recreational 
benefits can be defined by the number of visits v and the index of enjoyment Φ.  
Therefore, V=vΦ.  Now, let a1 and a2 be variables for the amount of time spent engaged 
in each of the two activities.  Next, let qj represent the quality of the activity such that 
for each individual the quality-adjusted amount of activity j engaged in for each 
individual is represented by αj=ajqj.  Therefore, Φ=Φ(α1,α2) represents the enjoyment 
per visit derived for each individual (Turner, 2000). 
 Congestion, park size, and wilderness will affect visitor enjoyment, although to 
what degree depends upon visitor preferences.  Therefore, quality decreases by γj for 
each additional unit of congestion and quality increases in relation to the size of the park, 
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Z, and wilderness area, W.  None the less, it should be recognized that an increase in 
wilderness area can increase congestion.  Thus, quality of activity j by for each 
individual is given by q(γj,Z,W) (Turner, 2000). 
 Total congestion is a function of the total amount of each activity.  Therefore, if 
A1=Σva1 and A2=Σva2, then γj(A1,A2,Z,W).  Z and W are included because the larger the 
size of the park or the larger the wilderness area, the less likely there will be congestion 
cross-over effects that interfere with individual enjoyment of the park.  Similarly, 
wilderness can be defined as a function the two activities and park size, or W=W(A1,A2,Z) 
(Turner, 2000). 
Efficiency Conditions 
 The socially efficient allocation of resources can then by found by maximizing the 
Benthamite social welfare function ΣU with respect to the resource constraint 
E≥Σy+Στv+C(Z,A1,A2) where E is society’s endowment of the numeraire, τ is each 
individual’s travel cost, and C(·) is the cost function for the park.  Therefore, the 
Lagrangian for the constrained optimization problem is: 
(T1) L= ΣU(y,V,W)+μ(E- Σy+Στv+C(Z,A1,A2))     
Where V= vΦ(a1q1(γ1(A1,A2,Z,W),Z,W),a2q2(γ2(A1,A2,Z,W),Z,W)); Aj=Σvaj for j=1,2; 
W=W(A1,A2,Z) and μ is the Lagrangian multiplier.  The park manager/planner then 
chooses y, v, a1, and a2 for each individual and also chooses Z.  First order conditions 
can then be manipulated to yield, 
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which represents the aggregate costs to visitors caused by marginal increases in 
congestion due to activities 1 and 2; PW=ΣjMRSWy is a Samuelson summation of marginal 
rates of substitution.  PW measures the aggregate benefit to society of an increase in W.  
εZ and εW show the effect of park size and wilderness on visitor enjoyment.  Expression 
T5 is the provisional condition whereby the park’s size should by enlarged until marginal 
social benefit is greater than marginal social cost.  Having a larger park is beneficial 
because it decreases congestion, increases wilderness, and thus leads to potentially 
greater rates of visitor enjoyment.  Expressions T2 thru T4, represent toll (user fee) 
conditions (Turner, 2000).   
Utility Maximization for Individuals 
 “An individual maximizes utility subject to the constraint that consumption of the 
numeraire plus the cost of visitation, which includes travel costs as well as a park 
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entrance fee F and tolls t for each activity, must not exceed the individual’s endowment 
of the numeraire E (Turner, 2000, 477).”  The Lagrangian can be written, 
(T7) L=U(y,vΦ(a1q1,a2q2),W+λ(E-y-(τ+F-t1a1-t2a2)v)   
where variables y, v, a1, and a2 are choice variables and λ is the Lagrange multiplier.  
Assuming people do not consider congestion a deterrent to visiting the park yields a set 
of first order conditions which can be manipulated to give, 
(T8) MRSVy= τ+F+t1a1+t2a2   
(T9) MRSVy1
q1=t1 and   
(T10) MRSVy2
q2=t2   
Interpretation of Toll Conditions 
Using the individual’s optimization conditions T9 and T10, T3 and T4 implies 
that the planner can influence individuals to make socially efficient choices by 
implementing a toll equal to 
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where the first term is the partial derivative of the cost function with regard to each 
activity, the second and third terms represent the increased tolls in response to an increase 
in congestion due to increased consumers for activities 1 and 2, and the last term 
represents the increase in tolls as a result of diminishing wilderness as a result of 
increased congestion.  While the toll for each of the two activities should be different, 
each individual should pay the same toll.  Some individuals may pay more because they 
consume a greater amount (Turner, 2000). 
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 These tolls should help to internalize two types of externalities.  First, as 
congestion increases, tolls will increase.  Second, assuming the visitor activities reduce 
wilderness levels, this will raise tolls.  Efficient activity tolls will mean that the resulting 
efficient entrance fee, F, is zero (Turner, 2000). 
 
VI. Prato Model 
 Conventional definitions of carrying capacity were defined by the “number of 
visitors an area can sustain without degrading natural resources and visitor experiences 
(Prato, 2001, 322).”  New definitions of carrying capacity, however, define carrying 
capacity as the “acceptability of natural resources and human impacts as measured by 
selected biophysical resource and social conditions, rather than the number of visitors 
(Prato, 2001, 321).”  And while much progress has been made in determining carrying 
capacity, much of the previous work has been non-quanitative, thus making it difficult for 
park managers to provide quantitative proof that their park is meeting established 
standards for biophysical and social carrying capacity (Prato, 2001). 
 Prato’s model consists of an ex post adaptive ecosystem management (AEM) 
model and the ex ante multiple attribute scoring test of capacity (MASTEC) method.  
The AEM model “determines whether the current state of an ecosystem is compliant with 
biophysical and social carrying capacities…[by incorporating] adaptive management and 
ecosystem management principles…[that are] implemented using Bayes’ rule (Prato, 
2001, 322).”  The MASTEC method “identifies the best management action for bringing 
an incompliant ecosystem into compliance…[by utilizing] a stochastic multiple attribute 
programming model (Prato, 2001, 322).” 
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AEM Model 
 To begin, assume each unit of the National Park Service falls into one of four 
categories after evaluating the unit’s compliance with policy concerning caring capacity: 
M1, M2, M3, or M4, where M1 is highly compliant, M2 is moderately compliant, M3 
moderately incompliant, and M4 is highly incompliant.  The prior probabilities are then 
p(M1), p(M2), p(M3), and p(M4) which sum to one.  Next, let R1, R2, R3, and R4 
represent the characteristics of a unit’s resource/social conditions.  For example, let the 
percentage of native species and suitable endangered species habitats represent the 
resource attribute and let the level of congestion and wait-time for public transportation 
in the park be the social attribute.  R1 in this case represents a significant loss in native 
species, highly degraded endangered species habitats, high levels of congestion, and very 
long wait-times for public transportation.  R2 units will have moderate loss in native 
species, moderately degraded endangered species habitats, moderately high levels of 
congestion, and long wait-times for public transportation.  R3 units will have most 
native species present, good habitat areas for endangered species, low congestion, and 
short wait-times for public transportation.  R4 units have abundant native species, 
excellent habitats for endangered species, very little congestion, and very short wait-
times for public transportation (Prato, 2001).   
 The AEM model uses Bayes’ rule in order to minimize errors due to park 
managers misidentifying the unit’s carrying capacity.  There are two types of errors that 
commonly occur.  The first occurs when the park manager identifies a unit as being 
compliant with carrying capacity conditions when it is not.  The second occurs when the 
park manager decides the unit is incompliant with carrying capacity conditions because 
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of resource/social conditions when the park is actually compliant with carrying capacity 
conditions (Prato, 2001). 
 Using the AEM model, (Mi Rq) is the outcome of a unit’s carrying capacity and 
resource/social condition where i=1,2,…I and q=1,2,…Q, thus resulting in IQ possible 
outcomes.  “Prior probabilities of resource social condition Rq (outcomes are mutually 
exclusive) is, 
(P1) p(Rq)=p(M1,Rq)+…+p(MI Rq)   
where p(Mi Rq) is the joint probability of (Mi Rq) (Prato, 2001, 324).”  Bayes’ rule 
defines the “probability that the ecosystem is in state M, given the condition Rq, is: 
(P2) p(Mi|Rq)=p(Mi Rq)/p(Rq)=[p(Rq|Mi)p(Mi)]/[Σp(Rq|Mi)p(Mi)]   
where p(Mi|Rq) is the posterior probability, p(Rq|Mi) is the likelihood function for Rq, 
p(Mi) is the prior probability of Mi, and Σp(Rq|Mi)p(Mi) is the expected value of the 
likelihood function (Prato, 2001, 324).”  
MASTEC Method 
If the AEM model indicates that the unit is most likely R3 or R4, than there is no 
need for the park manager to makes changes.  However, if the AEM model indicates 
that the unit is R1 or R2 the MASTEC method can be used to achieve a compliant 
ecosystem state.  “The MASTEC method is an ex ante procedure…[that helps] the 
manager select the best management action for achieving compliance with carrying 
capacities (Prato, 2001, 324).”  The MASTEC method integrates the Limits of 
Acceptable Change and Visitor Impact Management carrying capacity methods.  The 
Limits of Acceptable Change method “requires a manager to identify where and to what 
extent, changes in key biophysical and social processes are appropriate and acceptable, 
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and to select a management action that is most likely to achieve conformance between 
observed conditions and established standards (Prato, 2001, 324) .”  A schematic of the 
MASTEC method is given below in Figure 1 (Prato, 2001, 325), 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The best result for management will maximize the expected utility function 
“E[U(z)] subject to the constraint z=a+e where z is a stochastic vector of attributes 
provided by a management action, a is the deterministic component of z, which gives the 
expected amounts of all attributes provided by the management action, and e is the 
stochastic component of z, where E(e)=0 (Prato, 2001, 331).” 
By solving the following chance-constrained mathematical programming 
problem, management will find the best solution:  
Maximize E[U(z*)]=  
E[U(a*+e*)] subject to:Pr{ }
* **b bj j ≥1-αj for j=1,…,J, and  
 Pr{ }* **s sk k ≥1-βk for k=1,…,K 
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where * indicates normalized attribute values.  This is done to reduce management 
ranking bias created by differences in measurement units and to convert negative 
attributes (attributes that are negatively related to utility) to positive attributes.  Thus, 
rather than less of an attribute increasing utility, more of an attribute increases utility.  
The normalized attribute falls between [0,1].  The biophysical attributes b j
*  are at least 
as great as the biophysical standard bj
**  with reliability 1-αj where 0< αj <1 for all j 
biophysical attributes.  Similarly, social attributes sk
*  are at least as great as the social 
standards sk
**  with reliability 1-βk where 0< βk <1 for all K social attributes (Prato, 
2001). 
Specifying that E[U(z*)] is additive, meaning 
E[U(z*)]= E U z E U zV J K[ ( )] ... [ ( )]
* *
1 1    , implies that the marginal utilities of each of the 
attributes are independent.  Assuming the manager is risk neutral, the expected utility 
function is, E[U(z*)]=
j
J
j jv
k
K
k kvw b w s
 

1 1
 
* *  where wj and wk are the weights for the jth 
biophysical attribute and the kth social attribute,  0< wj <1, 0< wk <1, and 
j
J
j
k
K
kw w
 
 
1 1
1  .  If the manager has constant risk aversion, then 
E[U(z*)]=
j
J
j j j j
k
K
k k k kw a c w a c
 
  
1
2
1
2
 [ ] [ ]  ; and if the manager has variable risk 
aversion and the utility subfunctions, Ui( zi
* ), then 
E[U(z*)]=
j
J
j j j j
k
K
k k k kw U a c w U a c
 
  
1
2
1
2
 [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]   with expected values aj and ak, 
variances  j
2
 and k
2 , and positive scaling constants cj and ck (Prato, 2001). 
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 Using a multiple attribute decision-making framework to implement the 
MASTEC method has the advantage of allowing more complex information concerning 
management decisions to be collapsed into a single number, it permits stakeholders with 
different attributes and/or values to rank and select management actions, it allows 
managers to identify the best method for complying with carrying capacity standards, and 
allows managers to evaluate the sensitivity of a management action to changes in 
attribute weights and values (Prato, 2001).   
 
VII. Analysis and Evaluation of the Four Models 
 The initial framework provided by Buchanan has served as a benchmark/point of 
departure for each of the subsequent models.  Ng’s model is a modification of 
Buchanan’s that utilizes aggregate consumer marginal valuation rather than individual 
consumer marginal valuation.  Turner makes the choice to rewrite Buchanon’s utility 
function in terms of a Benthamite social welfare function using a numeraire good, 
recreation, and wilderness area.  Turner then rewrites the constraint in terms of society’s 
valuation of the numeraire, travel costs, and the cost function of the park.  In contrast, 
while the previously mentioned authors make use of the Lagrange method to maximize 
utility subject to a constraint, Prato takes a different route by employing the more 
technology based MASTEC method. 
 While Buchanan’s and Ng’s models help to formulate a model for general club 
goods, Turner and Prato’s models specifically focus on applications concerning national 
parks.  Because these models have yet to be implemented it is important that the models 
are evaluated and their weaknesses addressed.    
Smith 
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Turner 
 Turner’s (2000) model has several implementation problems.  First, Turner’s 
model uses εZ and εW to measure the impact of wilderness area and park size on visitor 
enjoyment.  The potential problem with this is that both of these measures are inelastic.  
A park manager typically does not have the option of expanding the park when 
congestion levels are high.  Nor does the park manager have the ability to expand the 
number of trees in a short time frame.  This was one of the original arguments given by 
Weisbrod (1964) concerning the difficulty in storing or quickly replacing lost resources. 
 Data collection is particularly difficult in regards to using Turner’s (2000) model 
to estimate carrying capacity.  Currently, the appropriate data are not being collected to 
use this model.  Turner’s model requires the collection of data concerning the levels of 
congestion for various park activities and wilderness levels.  Data also needs to be 
collected regarding park costs, visitor enjoyment, and public valuation of park services.  
Further difficulties exist in regard to formulating an effective survey, which is often a 
difficult and costly task that can result in biased conclusions.  
Prato 
 While Prato’s (2001) model may be the most difficult to implement, it may also 
prove to be the most useful.  The most difficult task is the development of a spatial 
decision support tool.  The development of this tool would provide numerous benefits to 
park management.  First, it would make it easier to acquire and analyze technical 
information and public input.  Second, the public would become more informed about 
the consequences of management decisions.  The development of this tool would 
“enhance the manager’s and public’s understanding of how different attribute weights, 
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attribute standards and reliability levels for achieving standards influence the selection of 
the best management action (Prato 2001, 329).”  The development of this tool would 
also provide an analytic method for determining park managers’ decisions.  Finally, this 
tool would also help to alleviate conflict and create a database that would be useful for 
soliciting other funding opportunities.   
The aforementioned benefits of Prato’s model not withstanding, major 
impediments to implementing Prato’s (2001) model include budgetary restrictions, a lack 
of technical expertise, high turnover of park management, and the long time-frame 
required to implement the AEM model, although some of the budgetary problems may be 
overcome by soliciting grant money.  
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
A sizable weakness of each of the models is the assumption that it is possible to 
exclude individuals who are not able and/or willing to be a part of the club.  This 
includes both the direct violations as a result of visitors subverting park rules by making 
use of the park’s services without paying a fee and more indirect violations.  For 
example, non-users benefit from the maintenance of national park areas regardless of 
whether they choose to make use of the park.  Some of these benefits include cleaner 
air, higher property values, scenic vistas, and preservation of wildlife.  So long as the 
possibility exists for park users to make use of park services without paying the 
associated fees, there will be a percentage of consumers who will take advantage of the 
situation.  This problem is further compounded by the difficulty and expense incurred in 
monitoring and fining these “free riders.”    
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The ability to identify carrying capacity thresholds is also a difficult task for park 
managers.  An individual’s perception of environmental “damage” is often a subjective 
measure and therefore makes identifying a threshold level of damage extremely difficult.  
Some would measure this threshold as the point where damage becomes “noticeable” to 
consumers.  At this point, demand for the good falls sharply and so the manager might 
see carrying capacity as a function of the number of visitors.  This is not necessarily a 
consistent value, however, due to the fact that increased education and better 
management may lead to increased carrying capacity for the park (Davis, 2001). 
Another concern is the transformation of national parks into a kind of 
“amusement park.”  If activities fees are used, how will this change the way the park 
looks?  How will it change consumers’ experiences?  Do we charge hikers for each 
mile walked or do we restrict activity fees to activities such as tours, boating, etc.?  
These are all issues that would need to be addressed by the park manager if user fees 
were implemented.    
Finally, any model incorporating a toll or user fee creates an ethical dilemma 
regarding the exclusion of the poor from public property.  When one considers that there 
are few places for low-income families to enjoy recreational activities, some would argue 
that charging fees potentially excludes low-income families from a public good.  
Additionally, national parks are already subsidized by federal dollars that are the result of 
taxation.  This means that some individuals may be paying for a good they are unable to 
use.  This also raises a question regarding whether individual consumers of parks or all 
individuals who pay taxes should be responsible for maintaining park facilities.  
Smith 
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Ultimately, a decision will need to be made in regard to the implementation of user fees; 
is the goal to reduce subsidization, reduce congestion, or both? 
 
Smith 
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